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Organ
transplantation has been a
favorite topic of health lawyers since
its inception. Organ procurement was
addressed with the adoption of the
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act in all
fifty states, and "brain death" has been
recognized both judicially and legislatively across the country. Nonetheless, it is now apparent that the major
problems in organ transplantation are
not legal and thus neither are their
solutions. Heart and liver transplants
are extreme and expensive interventions that few individuals can afford
and few hospitals can offer. In an era
of economic scarcity, how (if at all)
should organ transplant procedures
and other extreme and expensive
treatment be introduced into the
health delivery system?
Although it seems reasonable to expect federal leadership to establish a
limited number of high-quality transplant centers, federal efforts to date
have focused almost exclusively on
trying to help the scattered organ procurement agencies become more efficient. By default, the individual states
have had to develop their own policies. A number of them, like California and Connecticut, have concentrated on Medicaid reimbursement requirements. Ohio has worked to develop a statewide "consortium" ap.proach. But until late 1984, only Mas-
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sachusetts had established a statewide
public task force to make recommendations concerning how heart and
liver transplants should be introduced. The Massachusetts Task Force
grew out of a recommendation, made
by Dr. Harvey V. Fineberg's earlier
Liver Transplantation Task Force, that

The Task Force recommended that the analysis of
priorities begin with the presumption that all currently
offered health care services
have a higher priority than
organ transplantation.
a broadly based public group examine
the social issues involved with transplantation technology. The Massachusetts experience is important not only
because it is the first state to utilize
the strategy of a public task force, but
also because of the strong medical institutions in Massachusetts, the vigorous use of determination-of-need
mechanisms to regulate the introduction of liver and heart transplants, and
the almost overwhelming desire of at
least four Boston hospitals to do liver
transplantation and of four Boston
hospitals to do heart transplantation.
Indeed, at times the political aspects
of whether one hospital or more than
one hospital should do either of these
procedures have eclipsed all of the
other critical issues involved in using
these extreme and expensive technologies.
The complete set of recommendations, as well as the Task Force's
charge and a description of its process, is included in the sections of the

Final Report reproduced in this issue
of Law, Medicine & Health Care. The
recommendations themselves went to
public hearing on November 5, 1984,
and on November 27, 1984, the policy-making body of the Massachusetts
Department of Public Health, the
Public Health Council, unanimously
adopted the recommendations as official Policy Guidelines and used the
Report itself as explanatory text for
the Department in reviewing determination-of-need applications for organ
transplantation.
Major Conclusions
Although sometimes lost in bland
prose, several significant conclusions
were reached by the Task Force,
which structured its set of recommendations. The basis of the Report can
be stated in one long sentence. Because transplants are extreme and expensive procedures that nevertheless
do not cure disease but replace the
patient's underlying disease with a
lifetime of immunosuppression, and
because introducing transplantation
into the current cost-constrained
health care system threatens to displace other, higher priority health
care services (including services to
the Medicaid population and the
poor), transplants should not be performed at all unless they are done on
those who are likely to benefit from
them, unless the total cost is controlled, and unless resources are not
diverted from higher priority care. In
fleshing out this basic principle, the
Task Force concluded that public regulation would be ineffective if the
burden of proving health care priorities was placed on the Department of

Public Health. Accordingly, the Task
Force recommended that the analysis
of health care priorities begin with a
presumption that all currently offered
health care services have a higher
priority than organ transplantation.
Therefore, any hospital applying to
perform transplants should have the
burden of demonstrating that "transplantation has a higher priority than
any other currently available health
service from which organ transplantation diverts funds and/or support systems."

Limitation is a fair policy so
long as we make transplants
available to all who are clinically suitable in an equitable
manner.
On the underlying value issues of
fairness and equity, the Task Force
concluded that access to a transplant
must be "independent of the individual's ability to pay for it." Thus, if offered at all in the system, heart and
liver transplants must be considered
part of the "minimum benefit package" to which all are entitled. But
how could the health care system,
which arguably could not handle organ transplants at all, introduce them
in a manner that would make them
available to everyone? The key is to
restrict the total number of transplants done. However, this must be
accomplished in a manner that optimizes the quality of care and benefit of
those procedures actually performed,
eliminates arbitrary patient selection
excluders (such as income, age, and
personal habits), and provides an equitable manner of selecting among
suitable candidates when not all can
be served. The most crucial element
is to define "cliniical suitability" for
transplantation in a manner that concentrates on benefit to the patient in
terms of life style and rehabilitation
rather than simple survival. In the
words of the Task Force, medical suitability should be an attempt to predict
"those who can benefit the most from
[transplants] in terms of probability of
living for a significant period of time
with a reasonable prospect for rehabilitation." Critical to maintaining a

strict definition of "clinical suitability"
is the restriction of total system capacity to perform transplants, as explained in the summary of the economics section later in this article.
Application of the Report
The utility of the Task Force Report,
its recommendations, and the new
Policy Guidelines of the Massachusetts Department of Public Health
will face their first test when they are
used to determine the public need for
a four-hospital consortium to do heart
transplants in Massachusetts in early
1985. A separate four-hospital consortium was approved to do liver transplants for a three-year period in January 1984. Conditions were placed on
that determination of need, including
requirements that the hospital not
consider ability to pay or insurance
status in patient selection, not reduce
Medicaid services as a trade-off for
liver transplantation, not reduce free
care for non-transplant services below
that provided in the most recent fiscal
year, and have its liver transplantation
protocols reviewed and approved by
an institutional review board. The

Clinical suitability is not an
immutable scientific fact, but
one that is highly influenced
by the environment.
members of the Consortium objected
to these conditions, and appealed
them to the Health Facilities Appeals
Board, which ordered a remand on
procedural grounds. On remand, the
Public Health Council explicitly
adopted the conditions, with some
modifications, over the objections of
the Consortium. The IRB review requirement was modified most significantly to read:
The hospital will have its liver
transplant protocols, including
consent and withdrawal of consent policies, organ procurement
policies, recipient selection policies and confidentiality policies,
reviewed and approved by an
ethics committee of the Boston
Center for Liver Transplantation,
which will contain significant

public representation, or by a
special board set up for this purpose by the Department of Public
Health.
It remains to be seen whether the
Liver Consortium can live up to the
Policy Guidelines. While the hospitals
did not have to satisfy the Guidelines
originally, they will serve as minimum requirements for any renewal of
their DONs two years from now.
Other Sections of the Report
Portions of the Report not included in
this issue are sections on economics,
religious views, and the consortium
approach. The latter two can be dealt
with relatively quickly. The Task
Force found no religious tradition
that prohibited organ donation or
transplantation, and the perspectives
included in the Report from the Catholic, Protestant and Jewish traditions
were all supportive of organ transplants. As previously mentioned, the
consortium approach is primarily a
political issue. It was grafted onto the
original draft of the Report at the request of the Commissioner of Public
Health. In March 1984, Commissioner
Bailus Walker asked the Task Force's
opinion about the advisability of
granting a temporary exemption from
determination of need to the Brigham
and Women's Hospital, a tertiary care
hospital, to do heart transplants. Such
a single-hospital exemption was seen
as preferable to having multiple hospitals request "emergency waivers"
for individual patients while they pursued an institutional DON (this procedure was used for liver transplants
in the Commonwealth by the Deaconess Hospital for more than six
months). The Commissioner found it
impossible to refuse such requests,
and the use of emergency waivers in
heart transplantation would have undercut any reasonable planning efforts.
The Commissioner's request for advice quickly became politicized, and a
loose "consortium" of hospitals was
thrown together to provide an alternative to the single-hospital exemption.
The Task Force met three times on
this issue. At its final meeting on this
subject, May 15, 1984, the Task Force
appeared for the first time in its enFebruay
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tirety. Following a two-hour discussion, which was highlighted by a
comment from State Senator Ed Burke
that the paper consortium looked
more like a "fig leaf" to cover "naked
rivalry" among the hospitals, rather
than a serious effort at cooperation,
the Task Force voted unanimously to
recommend a DON exemption for
heart transplants in Brigham and
Women's Hospital until the end of
1984. In addition, the Task Force
voted to attempt to develop guidelines for a "truly cooperative consortium." A summary of guidelines for a
"worthwhile consortium" appears in
the group's final recommendation.
Economics
Since it was the cost of these extreme
and expensive procedures that initially led to the formation of the Task
Force, the Report's economic section
and its conclusions are critical to any
understanding of the recommendations. The analysis describes the many
different ways of determining "costs"
of transplants, and uses the specific
figures generated by various agencies
as examples of how divergent figures
are calculated.
In general, hospitals have used only
direct costs in the figures they have
relied on to support their applications
for determinations of need. Figures
from the Massachusetts Liver Transplantation Task Force and Massachusetts Blue Cross, on the other hand,
utilized fully-allocated average costs.
While arguments can be made for
both views, the Task Force decided to
use fully-allocated-average- costs-forone-year-of-survival as a benchmark
for determining the cost of transplants
and comparing it to the costs of other
extreme and expensive medical procedures. In computing the costs of
heart and liver transplants, the cost of
the surgery itself is generally the
smallest item, amounting to only
about five percent of the cost, for example, of a liver transplant. About
one-fourth of the cost is attributable
to readmission to the hospital due to
complications, and almost one-half of
the total is attributable to ancillaries
such as laboratory, blood, intravenous
lines, radiology, social work, and
physical therapy. The most important
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cost determiners are the number of
ICU days that will be used by the patient and the cost of these days. Fully
allocated, average costs will be a
function not only of this, but also of
the probability of surviving for one
year and thus using the ICU bed for a
longer period of time (and for additional years, if we want to arrive at
average total costs).
Using this model, the Task Force
derived costs of $230,000 to $340,000
per liver transplant patient alive at the
end of one year (using a 70 percent
survival rate), and $170,000 to
$200,000 per one-year survival for
heart transplant patients (also using a
70 percent survival rate). Additional
years of survival would acid from
$10,000 to $20,000 in costs per year
to these figures. Compared to other
extreme and expensive medical care
examined by the Task Force (including neonatal ICU care, adult ICU care,
end-stage renal disease care, hemophilia, bone marrow transplants, and
variceal bleeding) on the basis of
fully-allocated average one-year costs,
the cost of heart and liver transplantation is 4 to 10 times more expensive
than any of these. That's the bad
news.
The good news is that these procedures can be performed for substantially less than this fully allocated cost
to the health care system at least in a
state like Massachusetts, which utilizes a prospective revenue cap on individual hospital budgets. Indeed,
this cap on prospective total revenue
may actually make innovation easier
by limiting the costs to the system. A
summary of the argument, which is
the economic underpinning of the
Report, runs like this. First, a significant portion of fully allocated costs
goes toward amortization of the physical plant. Thus, if procedures can be
"squeezed into" existing capacity
without displacing other procedures,
this cost will not have to be borne by
the system. Second, and most important, since cost is primarily a function
of ICU days, and since ICU days are a
function of readmission and complications, the cost will be less if readmissions can be lowered. This is
likely only if patient selection is kept
very strict, i.e., if transplants are given

to only those patients with strong
clinical suitability, in the sense of
being able to survive the transplant
for a significant period of time with
reasonable prospects for rehabilitation. Thus, cost becomes a function of
patient selection criteria.

In the absence of national
leadership on this subject,
states are forced to make
their individual ways as best
as they can.
Patient selection criteria, however,
tend to expand to include almost
everyone in the absence of restraints
on the system. This was well demonstrated in the end-stage renal disease
program in which universal entitlement has led to universal treatment,
whether medically beneficial or not.
No one wants to repeat this experience with heart and liver transplantation, and thus no national politician
has even suggested that heart and
liver transplants be covered by Medicare. Indeed, even though he has
made nationwide appeals for livers
for children, President Ronald Reagan
threatened to veto an organ transplant
bill that would have provided federal
money to pay the $6,000 needed annually for cyclosporin to immunosuppress transplant recipients, unless this
portion of the bill was deletedwhich it was.
Clinical suitability is not an immutable scientific fact, but one that is
highly influenced by the environment. It is the Task Force's view that
clinical suitability criteria will depend
to some significant degree on system
capacity. Thus, if system capacity is
restricted, the clinical suitability criteria would remain relatively stringent.
This would help insure that only
good candidates received transplants,
and thus that the health care system
would not have to be expanded to accommodate large numbers of patients. This would, in turn, ensure a
cost-effective transplant program. The
conclusion is that in order to maintain
a cost-effective program, one must
limit volume. And this, of course,
makes determination of need a logical regulatory mechanism, one in

which demand is adjusted to system
capacity, rather than system capacity
being adjusted to demand. The chief
architect of this model, and author of
the Economics Section of the Final
Report, is Professor Marc Roberts of
the Harvard School of Public Health.
It should be noted that limitation is
a fair policy so long as we make transplants available in an equitable manner to all who are clinically suitable.
In this way, we can permit organ
transplants to become part of the
"minimum benefit package" for Medicare and Medicaid recipients and
even for the uninsured, without
"breaking the bank." A suggested way
to achieve equity of access is outlined
in the Report's section, "Patient Selection and Rationing Schemes."
Conclusions
Is all this merely an academic exercise? Won't the public demand expansion of the health care system to accommodate all who can obtain any
conceivable benefit from transplants,
no matter what the system costs? Possibly, but the experience with endstage renal disease has been radicalizing. There are, for example, 80,000
individuals on dialysis in the United
States today, yet only about 7,000, or
less than 10 percent, are on waiting
lists for kidney transplants. Because of
the shortage of available organs, physicians have determined that more
than 90 percent of all possible kidney
transplant candidates are not "clinically suitable." Capacity of the system
plays a critical role in this, and if we
can directly limit the system's capacity, we not only can limit the system's
costs, but also can provide the service
to those who can benefit the most
from it. A national system which limited heart and liver transplants to perhaps 20 high-quality centers is preferable. But in the absence of any national leadership on this subject,
states will be forced to make their individual ways as best as they can.
There will be tremendous pressures
on the states from the hospitals, the
media, and the public who cannot understand why such restrictions on capacity are being imposed. These pressures may be irresistible. But it may
also be that these pressures can be

resisted, at least during the 3-year
"Phase I" envisioned by the Task
Force, and that after this period of
limited transplantation and data gathering, we will have learned enough
about this issue to be able to make
sound public policy that can be persuasively articulated to the public so
that the policy is acceptable. So long
as the entire procedure is public and
perceived as fair, the potential for
regulatory success should not be discounted.
My physician friends are fond of
quoting the following line from Hamlet in describing organ transplantation, "Diseases desperate grown by

desperate appliances are relieved, or
not at all." The more appropriate passage for the regulator appears seven
lines earlier in the King's declaration:
"How dangerous is it that this man
goes loose! Yet must not we put the
strong law on him. He's loved of the
distracted multitude...." (IV.iii) In
this context, the man is organ transplantation. The challenge is to put
"the strong law on him" long enough
to persuade the public that a free-forall in organ transplantation is reckless, while a controlled system has
pay-offs in terms of quality of care,
equity, and cost savings.

Conference on
Organ Transplantation
Organ transplantation is becoming one of today's thorniest problems for
both individual and institutional health care providers.
To discuss and begin to solve the complex issues, the American Society of Law & Medicine is sponsoring, in April, Legal & Ethical Issues
Surrounding Organ Transplantation with the American College of Legal
Medicine and the National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute. Seventeen
national organizations, including the American Medical Association, the
American Hospital Association and the American Council on Transplantation, are cooperating sponsors. The conference will be held April 18-20,
1985, at the Hyatt Regency Crystal City, in Arlington, Virginia.
A special session of the conference will focus on the new legislation
giving the federal government a larger role in the formation of policy
regarding organ transplantation. What does the Organ Transplant and
Procurement Act represent for transplant centers? Who will bear the
burden of financing immunosuppressive outpatient therapy? To what extent should the federal government implement medical, ethical, and
legal policies on organ transplantation? These and other complex questions will be probed over three days by an outstanding multidisciplinary
faculty composed of experts in organ transplantation.
Such a gathering of experts is an event worthy of permanent documentation. Therefore, the conference organizers plan to compile a two-volume textbook that will consist of the proceedings of the conference and
an anthology of previously published articles. The text, which will be
published with the Health Administration Press of the University of Michigan, will disseminate these important discussions to those unable to
attend the conference.
For more information, contact Maureen Shepherd, Conference Registrar, American Society of Law & Medicine, 765 Commonwealth Ave.,
Boston, MA 02215.
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